In “Society Must Be Defended” by Michael Foucault he describes an interesting perspective on life and death. Specifically, “The right of life and death is a strange right” (pf.1440) and “In one sense, to say that the sovereign has a right of life and death means that he can, basically, either have people put to death or let them live, or in any case that life and death are not natural or immediate phenomena which are primal or radical, and which fall outside the field of power.” (1440) leaving a wonder of who then has the say if someone were to live or die. Considering life or death a strange right would then be put into conversation then who has this right to decide who is born or who is not. Would then hierarchical beings be put at the forefront of these decisions, and who assigned them this role? Theoretically speaking, the “theoretical paradox” (1440) would then fit the discourse of the unbalanced nature that would arise in front of his logic. 

Foucault goes on to discuss the ““biopolitics” of the human race” and the ways in which the “technology of power” (1442) has impacted how science has involved itself with the human race and the autonomy of the human body. Measuring the demographics of the human body and controlling the ways in which reproduction takes place feels almost oppressive. Mirroring how the control of life and death and the control over reproductive rights in womens seems like science’s way of controlling the human population’s way of living. While biopolitics is also concerned with other aspects of life, its precise confirmation over controlling the birthing rate is questionable. Additionally, Foucault explains, “Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life– as in an epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it.” (1443) describing the vast ways in which death is around us all and definite. The definiteness that is both life and the surety of death is what makes “biopower” all the more complex. If humans are not the deciders of their own fates based on choices, then wouldn’t life in itself be chosen for you? Such as death being the consequence or finite line between a life chosen or a life not. In a way we are all brought to life outside of our knowledge or willingness, yet choose to continue living, the only other decision being to not. Foucault is discussing whether we have the ability to make those choices with or without outside influences to alter or solidify.

In the first sentence of the excerpt from The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction, Foucault uses two terms we have encountered earlier in the current module on ideology/hegemony/power: “repression” and “bourgeois.” And we might be tempted to exclaim: “Aha! Marx and his successors! We must know something fundamental about Foucault’s coming discussion of the functioning of power!” Far from it, this assumption would be a grave simplification. While Marx previously presented us with an understanding of power characterized by an asymmetric power constellation, a clash of irreconcilable class interests, as well as an understanding that it is exactly that antagonism that propels history forward, Foucault pushes that idea to the periphery — perhaps even rejects it. He does this primarily by turning away from Marx’s materialism and the preoccupation with material conditions and instead focusing on language, discourse, and knowledge. Foucault says that with the emergence of bourgeois societies in the 17^th century, speaking about sex as it was practiced previously became highly regulated and restricted. On the one hand, talking about it became more and more difficult, and on the other hand, sex was dragged out of the realm of the practical and the relative obscure — the lights directed towards it. Suddenly everything related to sex mattered, had to be examined, and was accompanied by a “discursive explosion” (1421). According to Foucault, this sudden change doesn’t happen in a vacuum but concomitant with a broader epistemological break, in which a new constellation of ideas suddenly emerges and takes dominion. Power is here not understood as simply repressive but rather as a productive force that shapes discourse. Power is therefore not primarily exercised vertically (top-down), but much more equally distributed and functioning in all directions. As a result of taking us through several of those discursive breaks (confession/pastoral – political/economic/technical – population – schools), it doesn’t seem unreasonable to assume that Foucault argues for an understanding of history that is largely shaped by repeated discursive breaks, i.e. successions of power/knowledge constellations, that can go in all directions. It seems beyond question that this conveys a linear, let alone a progressive understanding of history, and I would argue that right here a problem of Foucauldian thought becomes clear. After all, it’s not unfair to say that Foucault draws a picture of society where “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” When it seems likely that one repressive regime will be replaced by another repressive regime, ad infinitum, it’s difficult not to feel defeated and hamstrung. I wonder whether we need to say goodbye to Papa Foucault. I’m struggling myself with the thought of having to let go of him. He’s been everywhere. Hugely influential in poststructuralist/postmodern thought — my entire undergrad experience was marked by him. And I loved it! I still enjoy writing papers that examine a text’s underlying discourses and dispersed power formations. But maybe he’s just not quite able to give us the tools we need for the current moment. Maybe it’s time we knocked him off the pedestal.

In The Wretched of the Earth, Franz Fanon poses a question central to the relevance of the arts in pursuing a more liberated society, “Is the struggle for liberation a cultural phenomenon or not?” (1366). Is there a place for the graphic novel writer, the rapper, the visual artist, the filmmaker, the television actor, and the video game designer in the movement towards a decolonized, just society that places power in the hands of the people rather than the hegemonic forces that stifle us? 

In undergrad, I debated with a close friend about the necessity of liberal arts in addition to the medical field. Orlando V. was a dear friend and contrarian of the most pragmatic sensibilities. His claim argued that literally saving individuals’ lives was monumentally more important than the trivial pursuits of interacting with and producing various forms of art. I countered, insisting there is life-giving and society-transforming power in literature, among other artistic endeavors. The tools that create culture construct realities for individuals, marginalized groups, and even nations.

In the aforementioned seminal work, Fanon illustrates the colonized natives’ ability to organize, as Antonio Gramsci dubs, “organic intellectuals.” These individuals break from the institutions of the powers that be to create new modes of being and produce a counterculture that threatens oppressive control. These grassroots organizers come from the native people of a land and deconstruct the manufactured consent that permeates the colonizers’ culture. Fanon helps track a possible trajectory of how such a movement develops, one that I will compare with the work and life of Chinua Achebe.

When a colonizing power invades, they do so not only with physical might but with an eye towards “cultural obliteration” in order to control the very reality and ideas that exist in the minds of their colonized subjects. (Fanon 1361) In Things Fall Apart and in an “Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness,” Chinua Achebe notes how the culture of the colonizer invades Nigeria and the heart of the Congo basin, respectively, writing a new reality and creating the terms by which people themselves are defined. The colonizer forces the colonized, the Igbo in Nigeria, and the Congolese into a new culture, religion, and political landscape that envisions them in racist ways, placing significations of inferiority in every aspect of their lives. 

As one witnesses with the converts in Things Fall Apart, some of the colonized attempt to fit into the schema of the colonizer “throw[ing] [themselves] in frenzied fashion in the frantic acquisition of the culture of the occupying culture” (Fanon 1361). Nevertheless, the occupiers see them as less than others, “depersonalize a portion of the human race” and, in effect, silence them (Achebe 1542). The colonizer sets the terms of culture and how these subjects ought to be perceived by those in power. 

However, according to Fanon, there is a path forward, one that Achebe’s life illustrates. The native intellectuals and artists begin to counter the “dominating power.” They become not merely subjects of reproduction of dominant culture but “producers” of literature, art, and ideas that lead to the “crystallization of the national consciousness” that will “disrupt literary styles and themes, and also create a completely new public” (Fanon 1362-1363). Achebe’s stunning works rose high in influence, challenging colonizing powers and cultural mindsets. Along with others, he formulates an indigenous counterculture and liberatory literature that influences the populace at such a scale as to animate the imaginations of the people, “by carving figures and faces which are full of life…the artist invites participation in an organized movement” (Fanon 1364). His own country, Nigeria, gained independence a few years after publishing his novel. This example does not suggest simplistic causation between this novel and that historical event. Rather, it proposes that the ideas envisioned in this novel and many other productions of culture by the colonized contributed to the actualization of a liberated Nigeria. 

The artist has a key role in deconstructing the culture of hegemony. They produce art from the people, demystifying the propaganda of the ruling classes and providing opportunities for a liberated existence and alternative realities. In effect, the arts also save lives.

Chinua Achebe’s “An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness” is typically celebrated as a strong indictment of European colonization. However, as Achebe demonstrates, this book enforces and perpetuates the bigotries that led to European colonization of Africa.

He begins by exploring how Conrad’s showcase of Africa’s visual aesthetic perpetuates racist notions of what Africa looks like. Achebe says that Conrad “… projects the image of Africa as “the other world, “the antithesis of Europe” (pg. 1537). Encountering this insightful observation reminded me of what was being discussed in my Fredrick Douglass class where the perception of Africans and by extension Africa was used to justify the existence of slavery. If there were to be any recognition of mutual emotions between enslaved Africans and slaveholders which would lead to a recognition of “kinship” then the system of slavery and by extension the racial hierarchy would no longer be able to stand on solid ground. Before this, he also mentions “… the need- in Western psychology to set Africa up as a foil to Europe, as a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar” (pg. 1537). I could not help but agree and add that Asia, the Middle East, and other countries/continents are also often treated as foils to European countries. This also gets done to the Indigenous people of the Americas as well. The rich cultures and histories of these places are made into pawns that colonization moves across the chessboard in such a way that ensures that only they have the moves to win.

One moment that caught my attention was when on pg. 1538 Achebe draws attention to a writing technique that Conrad uses “… engaged in inducing hypnotic stupor in his readers through a bombardment of emotive words…” (pg. 1538) I feel that Conrad did this throughout the narrative to hide from the consequences of his racist ideas by creating a distraction through language. This distraction ensures that he is not “… put him in conflict with…his readers” (pg. 1538). It can be said unfortunately that the debates that surround his book show how successful he was at being able to create a distraction. In the sense that some will still maintain that the book is worth celebrating in spite of the racism present through the narrative.

Another observation that Achebe made that stood out to me was that “For Conrad, things being in their place is of the utmost importance…Tragedy begins when things leave their accustomed place…” (pg. 1539). This obsession with things “being in their place” explains why colonizers or even the average person struggles to give up structures/systems rooted in bigotry because being in the “right place” is how they conceive of identity.

Last week, we discussed Marx’s argument that workers under capitalism are alienated from their labor in a few key ways. Alienation happens when workers don’t own the means of production, nor have control over production processes. In industrial/factory settings, for example, workers may only be responsible for one small step (attaching the aglet) in a long assembly chain (the production of a tennis shoe)–and the result is often a product that its own makers can’t afford (the Nike Air Force 1). Under these conditions, the worker is abstracted from both the product (the commodity) and their own time/labor (also a commodity).

I think Severance is useful in illustrating the relationship between these two levels of abstraction. First, it feels like an understatement to say that Lumon workers–at least the severed ones–are totally in the dark about what they’re working to create. Lumon is broadly described as some kind of biotech company, but the Macrodata Refinement team in particular has zero insight into the relationship between their daily work, which is described as “mysterious and important,” and the final product. (In fact, an underlying question in the show is… is there a final product?) Unlike the industrial landscape to which Marx & Engels responded, Severance is set in a familiar, late-stage capitalist environment in which workers are often tasked with the production of intangible, technology-based goods and services. Mark’s repetitive, instinct-based, game-like Cold Harbor project, for example, reminds me of the work of content moderators who are tasked with flagging and removing harmful content from platforms like TikTok, Meta, etc. Content moderators, often based in cities far from tech company headquarters (ex: India, Kenya and Malaysia are big hubs), might contribute to the goal of user safety, but their work also trains AI models that will ultimately replace their labor altogether. Like in Severance, content moderators are one piece in the production of one large, amorphous “product” but it’s not totally clear what’s being produced.

According to Marx, the workers in Severance, like all workers, are also alienated because they exchange their own labor/time for the concept of money. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that severed workers also make another kind of exchange. They agree to undergo an invasive, experimental medical procedure and in return, their Outie gets to experience life “free” of work. Here, the through line with Marx gets a little muddy–but I’ll do my best. The Severance case takes worker alienation to a literal extreme as the procedure creates a work self and a non-work self. This is reminiscent of a great section from The German Ideology:

“The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it” (659).

Severance mirrors Marx & Engels’ thinking here, down to the language of the self “outside his work.” And just as the above passage describes, an Innie’s labor–tragically–only exists to satisfy what is external to it. For me, the final twist in the Marx-Severance equation is that the primary commodity in the show is likely the severance procedure itself. Severance imagines a world in which we can skip the labor of work, but also of childbirth, the dentist, or a blood draw. The commodity, then, is the very procedure that enables the existence of severed workers–who likely labor only as a continuation of that initial experiment, as a way of testing and maintaining the technology. I’m not sure what to make of that in relation to Marx, besides the way that it so weirdly, eerily illustrates his prescient warning that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction. Would love to hear what other Severance watchers think.

Reading Althusser and Gramsci this week, it was impossible not to drift into the murky realm of contemporary news. Indeed, both Gramsci’s notion of the intellectual’s role in class reproduction and Althusser’s formulation of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) and their role in hegemonic assimilation evoke the same weary response: “You don’t know how bad things can really get.”

Taking as a jumping off point Gramsci’s argument that the intellectual role operates to produce “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population” (935) and Althusser’s emphasis on education as the preeminent ISA, we can already see the heightened context of our present situation: a recent newsletter by our institution proudly cites a ‘scorecard’ created to encourage repression of campus discourse on Palestine by a nominally anti-discriminatory organization which ran cover for Elon Musk’s fascist salute before a roaring crowd. Indeed, this policing of ideological boundaries is evident in the Norton anthology itself, where the introduction to Karl Marx speculates that after the fall of the USSR it may seem “perverse to study Marxist theory” and accuses a work of economics of “dehumanizing tendencies” best corrected by reading Dickens and Balzac (652-655). Regardless of the validity of such a reading of Marx, the ideological underpinnings here become more self evident with the inclusion of neo-liberal economist Friedrich Hayek, whose relevance to theory and criticism is decidedly more tenuous than Marx’s and whose introduction is notably silent on the catastrophic human consequences of his thought for Chile under Pinochet, the UK under Thatcher, or the United States’ own slow decline into austerity from Reagan to the non-agency known as “DOGE”. Not to mention Hayek’s exceedingly dehumanizing supposition that poverty is an acceptable market outcome created by the choices of the individuals who suffer in it. This criticism is not to impugn the individual scholars who edited this generally excellent volume, but to demonstrate Gramsci’s argument that the relation of the intellectual class to production is not direct, but performs functions “justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group” (935). The competition created by the mass formation of the intellectual position in Gramsci operates in a manner similar to Althusser’s ISA: hurt people hurt people, and interpellated subjects interpellate subjects. Even potentially dissident speech/action/ritual giving voice to class conflict operates from within ideology, and can always be reassimilated by ISAs and the everpresent commodity form. Che Guevara T-shirts and “Leninade” abound as consumer choices signalling a subject’s ironic and iconoclastic relation to hegemony without challenging the ritual practice of dominant ideology which Althusser foregrounds (1304).

Although education is still central to the “reproduction of the relations of production” (1295), our advanced stage of capitalism has given rise to an ISA which exceeds Althusser’s wildest nightmares. The internet, particularly in its dominant forms of “social media” and “content” (creation/consumption) operates today as a machine for the inscription of ideology on subjects, continuously reinforced through ritual and practice. Althusser argues that ideology does not operate through “ideas” but through ‘subjects’, whose ‘beliefs’ are inscribed through “practices, rituals, ideological apparatus” (1304). The earliest and most rigorous ideological formation occurs not at the schoolhouse but in front of the iPad screen. A young person is faced with a deluge, first with algorithmically generated videos in which The Joker, Elsa from Frozen and Spiderman act out base parodies of nursery rhymes, with this stage rapidly replaced by the realm of “influencers” whose studious documentation of their own rituals is reinscribed on the viewer in mimetic form (“the phone eats first”, “get ready with me”, “day in my life”). A feedback loop between our consumption and production (viewing and posting) allows for algorithms to guide us through the process of subject formation. Google AdSense ‘knows’ us in a vaguely psychoanalytic composite, driven by clicks, which leads to the (relatively well founded concern) that these algorithms drive extremism. As the primitive accumulation and productive forces which allowed capitalist rule for centuries, slow and reach their absolute limits, the system is strained. We see rising precarity and financialization (Klarna, sports-betting, quantitative trading) in the material economy we see a similar escalation and obfuscation in ISAs function. The task of submerging latent class conflict requires escalating means and internet culture promotes an alienating hierarchical individuation and typification— are you a “cracked coder”, “hustle-grindset crypto bro”, “trad-wife”, or are you cast outside of the realm of signification by the increasingly right leaning culture which inculcates us all, especially the young? 

“All that is solid melts into thin air, all that is holy is profaned” -Marx, The Communist Manifesto

“I am become meme”- Elon Musk 🤮

Alpha x Thomas Shelby🔥

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Antonio Gramsci, one of the most influential Marxist thinkers of the 20th century, challenged conventional ideas about intellectuals in The Formation of the Intellectuals. He argued that intellectuals are not a separate, elite class detached from society but are deeply embedded in social structures. His insights remain crucial today as we navigate the intersections of power, culture, and knowledge production.

Gramsci rejected the notion that intellectuals exist independently of class structures. Instead, he distinguished between traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals.

Traditional intellectuals, such as scholars, clergy, and artists, often see themselves as neutral and autonomous from economic and political forces. However, Gramsci argued that they typically serve the status quo, reinforcing existing power structures. Their work often aligns with the interests of the ruling class, even when they claim objectivity.

In contrast, organic intellectuals emerge directly from a social class and work to articulate its interests. They are not confined to academia but include community organizers, journalists, and labor leaders who shape the consciousness of their class. For example, in the industrial working class, trade union leaders and activists act as organic intellectuals by organizing workers and spreading class-conscious ideas. Not only does it Similarly, in today’s movements for racial and economic justice, grassroots activists and independent media figures play this role by challenging dominant narratives.

Gramsci’s broader theory of cultural hegemony explains why intellectuals are central to maintaining or resisting power. According to the Norton Anthology, it states how “they embrace instead a cultural politics that emphasizes the need of intellectuals to contest power in multiple ways and engage issues of race, gender, and identity. ” (page 929) He argued that ruling classes do not just control society through laws and coercion but also through ideology—by shaping what people believe is normal and acceptable.

Traditional intellectuals, such as mainstream journalists and university professors, often reinforce this hegemony by legitimizing dominant narratives. A hegemony is “manufactured consent,” created through the articulation of intellectuals in a public space.” (page 929) They help construct the “common sense” of society, making social inequalities appear natural and inevitable. For example, economic policies that benefit the wealthy are often framed as necessary for growth, while struggles for workers’ rights are dismissed as disruptive.

However, organic intellectuals can disrupt this process by creating counter-hegemonic ideas that challenge existing power structures. This makes intellectual work inherently political. Whether through education, media, or activism, the battle for ideas is just as crucial as economic struggles.

In an era of social media, digital platforms have democratized intellectual production, allowing organic intellectuals to bypass traditional gatekeepers. Influential thinkers now emerge from activist circles, independent journalism, and online discourse, often confronting mainstream narratives on race, class, gender, and imperialism.

However, the ruling class still exerts influence through corporate media, academia, and think tanks, shaping public discourse to maintain existing hierarchies. Even in democratic societies, dominant ideologies are reproduced through news outlets, school curricula, and entertainment media, subtly reinforcing existing power dynamics. The dominant group can only be determined when “its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional values” (page 933). Being part of this group of intellectuals requires more than just knowledge, but helping those around them grow as well. The more intellectuals there are, conquering will continue to succeed with newer and better ideas.

Gramsci’s analysis forces us to ask: Who controls the production of knowledge? Who benefits from dominant ideologies, and how can intellectuals—whether in academia, media, or grassroots organizing—work toward real social change?

If knowledge is power, then the real question is: How can intellectuals today use their power to challenge systems of domination rather than reinforce them?

In Antonio Gramsci, “Formation of the Intellectuals” what is constantly being reiterated is the concept of what it means to be considered a “traditional intellectual” (931). This led me to reflect on what I as a person use to consider someone as being an intellectual as well as how the education system sets up students to become intellectuals based on state standards. The concept of being considered intellectual being formed as an “organic”(930) construct was impactful, leading me to wonder if intelligence in itself is already pre decided based on your genetic makeup or ancestral history. The capacity in which a person is able to store their knowledge and has access to certain knowledge could evidently influence the amount of intellectual information a person obtains.
While the term “intellectual” holds various meanings as far as what as a society considers a person to need in order to be considered an intellectual person, it leads me to wonder who then ultimately is correct? Is it the educational system that is flawed which creates the standards that we received and must pass in order to obtain a diploma or certification ? Or the intellectuals themselves who create the criteria for whom is considered an intellectual?
Gramsci states, “And we have already observed that the entrepreneur, by virtue of his very function, must have to some degree a certain number of qualifications of an intellectual nature although his part in society is determined not by these, but by the general social relations which specifically characterise the position of the entrepreneur within industry.” (932) in this moment Gramsci is discussing the means in which an entrepreneur must go through in order to be considered an intellectual person. The assumption being that if the entrepreneur is successful this would mean they are an intellectual because they had the ability to make educated decisions that positively affected their business of entrepreneurship. While this is true, I agree with an entrepreneur having intellect in their speciality and their choice of profession. It does take a certain skill set in order to master a trade and execute it along with other concepts that are in the foreground such as balancing expenses, taxes, insurance etc. that comes with a business. My wonder then is, would the intellect of the entrepreneur be put into question if their business or deal does not hold a positive outcome? Would the entrepreneur then not be considered an intellectual?

After I had finished reading Antonio Gramsci’s “The Formation of the Intellectuals” there was something that he said I just couldn’t get out of my head. When he discusses how the idea of “intellectual” is distinguished in society he says “This means that although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist” (pg. 932). This is an interesting paradox because there is some truth to this argument. Sure, the closest thing to a “non-intellectual” could be a person who chooses not to further their knowledge of the world at large or does not have many hobbies. However, most people are not like this thus as Gramsci further explains “There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded…Each man, finally, outside of his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity…” (pg. 932). There is truth to this as well. Even when “the worker” after coming home takes a break from work (unless they do nothing but sleep) if they have a hobby that they enjoy participating in that hobby likely requires them to possess a level of intellectualism to engage with those hobbies in a meaningful way or even find any fulfillment in it. While writing this response I also thought about how the “intellectual” label and how it is applied to hobbies changes based on the person’s perceived social class. For example, when the “worker or proletarian” (pg. 932) sits to read a book, some praise them for stimulating their mind and expanding their knowledge base. Then others will make snide comments about how lazy or dumb they are for engaging in an activity that does not bring immediate monetary gains. When a person who is upper middle class or higher sits to read a book they will mostly receive praise for being a committed intellectual and only a select few will criticize them for being “idle rich”. This hypocritical application of judgment leads to the sentiment that “All men are intellectuals…but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals”. In the footnote, he gives an example of how a person can prepare a meal or mend a torn piece of clothing without being a “cook or a tailor” (pg. 932). His note holds truth but why this statement carries a level of concern for me is because it is this very sentiment held by many within society that promotes a narrow definition of what an intellectual is or looks like and has been used through history to devalue most blue-color occupations. An example would be how the decision to go to a trade college is still seen as a step down versus the decision to go to a traditional liberal arts college. It is this sentiment that is leading to how the Humanities is being defunded and devalued.

The pattern of argument goes like this: All revolutions in history only implement an act that was preconceived by minds — you don’t get Lenin if you didn’t have Marx first. The argument continues that political majorities can only be achieved in the long term if there are previously ideological majorities, i.e. if there is a revolution, it begins with the values of the existing system crumbling and generating opportunities to create new paths that lead to a new political constellation. What ostensibly sounds like an adequate account of (part of) Gramsci’s message has been central for the cultivation of the field of political culture by right-wing “intellectuals” of the so-called New Right since the 70s/80s. (Giorgia Meloni and Steve Bannon are reportedly fans of Gramsci!) Curiously enough, these extreme right-wing “intellectuals” draw on Gramsci, a founding member and leader of the Italian Communist Party, for strategic ideas. Indeed, Gramsci did something very unusual for Marxists at that time: Namely, moving away from the fixation on economic questions and toward cultural questions. The essence of which is that a successful revolution can only be made if the cultural and intellectual prerequisites for it have been created beforehand. Right-wing intellectuals take up this line of thought and simply transfer it to the right. It is thus an instrumentalization, a misuse, of a strategic approach originating with Gramsci. Nevertheless, the observation he made is quite accurate; after all, if we look at revolutionary upheavals or major social changes, it always has something to do with the influence of intellectual currents. Would the French Revolution have happened without the ideas of the Enlightenment? Would the 1968 revolt have happened without the thinkers of Critical Theory like Adorno, Horkheimer, and others? Most likely not. Here we can see a connection between intellectuality and phases of social upheaval, which, however, does not imply causality, but where such upheavals occur, they are often “thought” in advance. This is also why it is important to know something about the discourses of right-wing extremist intellectuals, because what they think today may become political practice tomorrow. Of course, these extremist right-wing intellectuals read Gramsci very selectively by focusing on the cultural-ideological aspects of his idea of “hegemony,” while conveniently ignoring the fact that for Gramsci this must be understood not merely in a culture-framework, but also in the context of the material base-structure and antagonistic class relations à la Marx.

The ludicrous right-wing hallucination that the left has been ruling society through alleged “cultural Marxism” in media, educational institutions, pop culture, arts, etc., perhaps stands for the dangers that lie in the cultural emphasis; after all, it provides convenient points of contact for the radical right’s historical preoccupation with questions of culture and identity. Since Marx’ materialist conception is incompatible with the ideology of the radical right, it is all the more important not to allow them to pretend that Gramsci can be read independently of basic Marxist assumptions.