Last week, we discussed Marx’s argument that workers under capitalism are alienated from their labor in a few key ways. Alienation happens when workers don’t own the means of production, nor have control over production processes. In industrial/factory settings, for example, workers may only be responsible for one small step (attaching the aglet) in a long assembly chain (the production of a tennis shoe)–and the result is often a product that its own makers can’t afford (the Nike Air Force 1). Under these conditions, the worker is abstracted from both the product (the commodity) and their own time/labor (also a commodity).

I think Severance is useful in illustrating the relationship between these two levels of abstraction. First, it feels like an understatement to say that Lumon workers–at least the severed ones–are totally in the dark about what they’re working to create. Lumon is broadly described as some kind of biotech company, but the Macrodata Refinement team in particular has zero insight into the relationship between their daily work, which is described as “mysterious and important,” and the final product. (In fact, an underlying question in the show is… is there a final product?) Unlike the industrial landscape to which Marx & Engels responded, Severance is set in a familiar, late-stage capitalist environment in which workers are often tasked with the production of intangible, technology-based goods and services. Mark’s repetitive, instinct-based, game-like Cold Harbor project, for example, reminds me of the work of content moderators who are tasked with flagging and removing harmful content from platforms like TikTok, Meta, etc. Content moderators, often based in cities far from tech company headquarters (ex: India, Kenya and Malaysia are big hubs), might contribute to the goal of user safety, but their work also trains AI models that will ultimately replace their labor altogether. Like in Severance, content moderators are one piece in the production of one large, amorphous “product” but it’s not totally clear what’s being produced.

According to Marx, the workers in Severance, like all workers, are also alienated because they exchange their own labor/time for the concept of money. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that severed workers also make another kind of exchange. They agree to undergo an invasive, experimental medical procedure and in return, their Outie gets to experience life “free” of work. Here, the through line with Marx gets a little muddy–but I’ll do my best. The Severance case takes worker alienation to a literal extreme as the procedure creates a work self and a non-work self. This is reminiscent of a great section from The German Ideology:

“The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it” (659).

Severance mirrors Marx & Engels’ thinking here, down to the language of the self “outside his work.” And just as the above passage describes, an Innie’s labor–tragically–only exists to satisfy what is external to it. For me, the final twist in the Marx-Severance equation is that the primary commodity in the show is likely the severance procedure itself. Severance imagines a world in which we can skip the labor of work, but also of childbirth, the dentist, or a blood draw. The commodity, then, is the very procedure that enables the existence of severed workers–who likely labor only as a continuation of that initial experiment, as a way of testing and maintaining the technology. I’m not sure what to make of that in relation to Marx, besides the way that it so weirdly, eerily illustrates his prescient warning that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction. Would love to hear what other Severance watchers think.

Reading Althusser and Gramsci this week, it was impossible not to drift into the murky realm of contemporary news. Indeed, both Gramsci’s notion of the intellectual’s role in class reproduction and Althusser’s formulation of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) and their role in hegemonic assimilation evoke the same weary response: “You don’t know how bad things can really get.”

Taking as a jumping off point Gramsci’s argument that the intellectual role operates to produce “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population” (935) and Althusser’s emphasis on education as the preeminent ISA, we can already see the heightened context of our present situation: a recent newsletter by our institution proudly cites a ‘scorecard’ created to encourage repression of campus discourse on Palestine by a nominally anti-discriminatory organization which ran cover for Elon Musk’s fascist salute before a roaring crowd. Indeed, this policing of ideological boundaries is evident in the Norton anthology itself, where the introduction to Karl Marx speculates that after the fall of the USSR it may seem “perverse to study Marxist theory” and accuses a work of economics of “dehumanizing tendencies” best corrected by reading Dickens and Balzac (652-655). Regardless of the validity of such a reading of Marx, the ideological underpinnings here become more self evident with the inclusion of neo-liberal economist Friedrich Hayek, whose relevance to theory and criticism is decidedly more tenuous than Marx’s and whose introduction is notably silent on the catastrophic human consequences of his thought for Chile under Pinochet, the UK under Thatcher, or the United States’ own slow decline into austerity from Reagan to the non-agency known as “DOGE”. Not to mention Hayek’s exceedingly dehumanizing supposition that poverty is an acceptable market outcome created by the choices of the individuals who suffer in it. This criticism is not to impugn the individual scholars who edited this generally excellent volume, but to demonstrate Gramsci’s argument that the relation of the intellectual class to production is not direct, but performs functions “justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group” (935). The competition created by the mass formation of the intellectual position in Gramsci operates in a manner similar to Althusser’s ISA: hurt people hurt people, and interpellated subjects interpellate subjects. Even potentially dissident speech/action/ritual giving voice to class conflict operates from within ideology, and can always be reassimilated by ISAs and the everpresent commodity form. Che Guevara T-shirts and “Leninade” abound as consumer choices signalling a subject’s ironic and iconoclastic relation to hegemony without challenging the ritual practice of dominant ideology which Althusser foregrounds (1304).

Although education is still central to the “reproduction of the relations of production” (1295), our advanced stage of capitalism has given rise to an ISA which exceeds Althusser’s wildest nightmares. The internet, particularly in its dominant forms of “social media” and “content” (creation/consumption) operates today as a machine for the inscription of ideology on subjects, continuously reinforced through ritual and practice. Althusser argues that ideology does not operate through “ideas” but through ‘subjects’, whose ‘beliefs’ are inscribed through “practices, rituals, ideological apparatus” (1304). The earliest and most rigorous ideological formation occurs not at the schoolhouse but in front of the iPad screen. A young person is faced with a deluge, first with algorithmically generated videos in which The Joker, Elsa from Frozen and Spiderman act out base parodies of nursery rhymes, with this stage rapidly replaced by the realm of “influencers” whose studious documentation of their own rituals is reinscribed on the viewer in mimetic form (“the phone eats first”, “get ready with me”, “day in my life”). A feedback loop between our consumption and production (viewing and posting) allows for algorithms to guide us through the process of subject formation. Google AdSense ‘knows’ us in a vaguely psychoanalytic composite, driven by clicks, which leads to the (relatively well founded concern) that these algorithms drive extremism. As the primitive accumulation and productive forces which allowed capitalist rule for centuries, slow and reach their absolute limits, the system is strained. We see rising precarity and financialization (Klarna, sports-betting, quantitative trading) in the material economy we see a similar escalation and obfuscation in ISAs function. The task of submerging latent class conflict requires escalating means and internet culture promotes an alienating hierarchical individuation and typification— are you a “cracked coder”, “hustle-grindset crypto bro”, “trad-wife”, or are you cast outside of the realm of signification by the increasingly right leaning culture which inculcates us all, especially the young? 

“All that is solid melts into thin air, all that is holy is profaned” -Marx, The Communist Manifesto

“I am become meme”- Elon Musk 🤮

Alpha x Thomas Shelby🔥

Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.

Antonio Gramsci, one of the most influential Marxist thinkers of the 20th century, challenged conventional ideas about intellectuals in The Formation of the Intellectuals. He argued that intellectuals are not a separate, elite class detached from society but are deeply embedded in social structures. His insights remain crucial today as we navigate the intersections of power, culture, and knowledge production.

Gramsci rejected the notion that intellectuals exist independently of class structures. Instead, he distinguished between traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals.

Traditional intellectuals, such as scholars, clergy, and artists, often see themselves as neutral and autonomous from economic and political forces. However, Gramsci argued that they typically serve the status quo, reinforcing existing power structures. Their work often aligns with the interests of the ruling class, even when they claim objectivity.

In contrast, organic intellectuals emerge directly from a social class and work to articulate its interests. They are not confined to academia but include community organizers, journalists, and labor leaders who shape the consciousness of their class. For example, in the industrial working class, trade union leaders and activists act as organic intellectuals by organizing workers and spreading class-conscious ideas. Not only does it Similarly, in today’s movements for racial and economic justice, grassroots activists and independent media figures play this role by challenging dominant narratives.

Gramsci’s broader theory of cultural hegemony explains why intellectuals are central to maintaining or resisting power. According to the Norton Anthology, it states how “they embrace instead a cultural politics that emphasizes the need of intellectuals to contest power in multiple ways and engage issues of race, gender, and identity. ” (page 929) He argued that ruling classes do not just control society through laws and coercion but also through ideology—by shaping what people believe is normal and acceptable.

Traditional intellectuals, such as mainstream journalists and university professors, often reinforce this hegemony by legitimizing dominant narratives. A hegemony is “manufactured consent,” created through the articulation of intellectuals in a public space.” (page 929) They help construct the “common sense” of society, making social inequalities appear natural and inevitable. For example, economic policies that benefit the wealthy are often framed as necessary for growth, while struggles for workers’ rights are dismissed as disruptive.

However, organic intellectuals can disrupt this process by creating counter-hegemonic ideas that challenge existing power structures. This makes intellectual work inherently political. Whether through education, media, or activism, the battle for ideas is just as crucial as economic struggles.

In an era of social media, digital platforms have democratized intellectual production, allowing organic intellectuals to bypass traditional gatekeepers. Influential thinkers now emerge from activist circles, independent journalism, and online discourse, often confronting mainstream narratives on race, class, gender, and imperialism.

However, the ruling class still exerts influence through corporate media, academia, and think tanks, shaping public discourse to maintain existing hierarchies. Even in democratic societies, dominant ideologies are reproduced through news outlets, school curricula, and entertainment media, subtly reinforcing existing power dynamics. The dominant group can only be determined when “its struggle to assimilate and to conquer “ideologically” the traditional values” (page 933). Being part of this group of intellectuals requires more than just knowledge, but helping those around them grow as well. The more intellectuals there are, conquering will continue to succeed with newer and better ideas.

Gramsci’s analysis forces us to ask: Who controls the production of knowledge? Who benefits from dominant ideologies, and how can intellectuals—whether in academia, media, or grassroots organizing—work toward real social change?

If knowledge is power, then the real question is: How can intellectuals today use their power to challenge systems of domination rather than reinforce them?

In Antonio Gramsci, “Formation of the Intellectuals” what is constantly being reiterated is the concept of what it means to be considered a “traditional intellectual” (931). This led me to reflect on what I as a person use to consider someone as being an intellectual as well as how the education system sets up students to become intellectuals based on state standards. The concept of being considered intellectual being formed as an “organic”(930) construct was impactful, leading me to wonder if intelligence in itself is already pre decided based on your genetic makeup or ancestral history. The capacity in which a person is able to store their knowledge and has access to certain knowledge could evidently influence the amount of intellectual information a person obtains.
While the term “intellectual” holds various meanings as far as what as a society considers a person to need in order to be considered an intellectual person, it leads me to wonder who then ultimately is correct? Is it the educational system that is flawed which creates the standards that we received and must pass in order to obtain a diploma or certification ? Or the intellectuals themselves who create the criteria for whom is considered an intellectual?
Gramsci states, “And we have already observed that the entrepreneur, by virtue of his very function, must have to some degree a certain number of qualifications of an intellectual nature although his part in society is determined not by these, but by the general social relations which specifically characterise the position of the entrepreneur within industry.” (932) in this moment Gramsci is discussing the means in which an entrepreneur must go through in order to be considered an intellectual person. The assumption being that if the entrepreneur is successful this would mean they are an intellectual because they had the ability to make educated decisions that positively affected their business of entrepreneurship. While this is true, I agree with an entrepreneur having intellect in their speciality and their choice of profession. It does take a certain skill set in order to master a trade and execute it along with other concepts that are in the foreground such as balancing expenses, taxes, insurance etc. that comes with a business. My wonder then is, would the intellect of the entrepreneur be put into question if their business or deal does not hold a positive outcome? Would the entrepreneur then not be considered an intellectual?