After I had finished reading Antonio Gramsci’s “The Formation of the Intellectuals” there was something that he said I just couldn’t get out of my head. When he discusses how the idea of “intellectual” is distinguished in society he says “This means that although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist” (pg. 932). This is an interesting paradox because there is some truth to this argument. Sure, the closest thing to a “non-intellectual” could be a person who chooses not to further their knowledge of the world at large or does not have many hobbies. However, most people are not like this thus as Gramsci further explains “There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded…Each man, finally, outside of his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity…” (pg. 932). There is truth to this as well. Even when “the worker” after coming home takes a break from work (unless they do nothing but sleep) if they have a hobby that they enjoy participating in that hobby likely requires them to possess a level of intellectualism to engage with those hobbies in a meaningful way or even find any fulfillment in it. While writing this response I also thought about how the “intellectual” label and how it is applied to hobbies changes based on the person’s perceived social class. For example, when the “worker or proletarian” (pg. 932) sits to read a book, some praise them for stimulating their mind and expanding their knowledge base. Then others will make snide comments about how lazy or dumb they are for engaging in an activity that does not bring immediate monetary gains. When a person who is upper middle class or higher sits to read a book they will mostly receive praise for being a committed intellectual and only a select few will criticize them for being “idle rich”. This hypocritical application of judgment leads to the sentiment that “All men are intellectuals…but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals”. In the footnote, he gives an example of how a person can prepare a meal or mend a torn piece of clothing without being a “cook or a tailor” (pg. 932). His note holds truth but why this statement carries a level of concern for me is because it is this very sentiment held by many within society that promotes a narrow definition of what an intellectual is or looks like and has been used through history to devalue most blue-color occupations. An example would be how the decision to go to a trade college is still seen as a step down versus the decision to go to a traditional liberal arts college. It is this sentiment that is leading to how the Humanities is being defunded and devalued.

The pattern of argument goes like this: All revolutions in history only implement an act that was preconceived by minds — you don’t get Lenin if you didn’t have Marx first. The argument continues that political majorities can only be achieved in the long term if there are previously ideological majorities, i.e. if there is a revolution, it begins with the values of the existing system crumbling and generating opportunities to create new paths that lead to a new political constellation. What ostensibly sounds like an adequate account of (part of) Gramsci’s message has been central for the cultivation of the field of political culture by right-wing “intellectuals” of the so-called New Right since the 70s/80s. (Giorgia Meloni and Steve Bannon are reportedly fans of Gramsci!) Curiously enough, these extreme right-wing “intellectuals” draw on Gramsci, a founding member and leader of the Italian Communist Party, for strategic ideas. Indeed, Gramsci did something very unusual for Marxists at that time: Namely, moving away from the fixation on economic questions and toward cultural questions. The essence of which is that a successful revolution can only be made if the cultural and intellectual prerequisites for it have been created beforehand. Right-wing intellectuals take up this line of thought and simply transfer it to the right. It is thus an instrumentalization, a misuse, of a strategic approach originating with Gramsci. Nevertheless, the observation he made is quite accurate; after all, if we look at revolutionary upheavals or major social changes, it always has something to do with the influence of intellectual currents. Would the French Revolution have happened without the ideas of the Enlightenment? Would the 1968 revolt have happened without the thinkers of Critical Theory like Adorno, Horkheimer, and others? Most likely not. Here we can see a connection between intellectuality and phases of social upheaval, which, however, does not imply causality, but where such upheavals occur, they are often “thought” in advance. This is also why it is important to know something about the discourses of right-wing extremist intellectuals, because what they think today may become political practice tomorrow. Of course, these extremist right-wing intellectuals read Gramsci very selectively by focusing on the cultural-ideological aspects of his idea of “hegemony,” while conveniently ignoring the fact that for Gramsci this must be understood not merely in a culture-framework, but also in the context of the material base-structure and antagonistic class relations à la Marx.

The ludicrous right-wing hallucination that the left has been ruling society through alleged “cultural Marxism” in media, educational institutions, pop culture, arts, etc., perhaps stands for the dangers that lie in the cultural emphasis; after all, it provides convenient points of contact for the radical right’s historical preoccupation with questions of culture and identity. Since Marx’ materialist conception is incompatible with the ideology of the radical right, it is all the more important not to allow them to pretend that Gramsci can be read independently of basic Marxist assumptions.