Art as Alienating: Marxist Ideas in Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility”
In his essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, Walter Benjamin comments on technology’s effect on art and how it alienates and dissolves meaning from the works and those involved with it. Discussing a critical history of the reproduction of art and the invention of film, the critic shows us how technology has changed our relationship to art similarly to how capitalism has changed the relationship between the worker and his product.
One of Benjamin’s most significant ideas from the piece is that of cult value versus exhibition value in art. Cult value, which he describes to be the significance of the art to a culture or religion, is gained through keeping artistic works from being seen, bringing it out only to serve the purposes of said culture or religion. Technological reproduction, through copies, pictures on the internet, or simply the ability to hop on a plane and visit the art heightens exhibition value (the ability to view the work of art), and diminishes the “aura” of the work, created by its special tie to its origin culture.
This is an especially Marxist argument, because it shows how an institution such as artistry, seen as one of the most disinterested areas in which to work, is subjected to capitalist ideals. Marx, in Capital, Volume I, discusses the value of commodities and the connection between that value and the time it took to produce them. He also examines how value through price does not do justice to a product’s value as a whole (i.e. use value, the narrative behind how a product was created etc.) With a capitalist society’s ability to produce a large number of products in a small amount of time, the value of said products drops, especially their qualitative value. The same happens when art is able to be seen by a great variety of people; art loses that special quality found in something that is rare or scarce.
Film, a different kind of art because it can only be produced by technology (whereas a painting can exist without it), is also discussed by Benjamin. While film is also subjected to the idea of mass reproduction and the loss of “aura” that other works of art are, the writer takes his argument further by stating that “The stage actor identifies himself with a role. The film actor very often is denied this opportunity. His performance is by no means a unified whole, but is assembled from many individual performances”(Benjamin 1061). Like the laborer Marx describes who cannot take ownership over his work because he has only a small part in creating the product, a film actor cannot take ownership over their performance because the film is not a direct representation of what he does. He will perform for the camera, and he will say all of his lines, but the end result is a series of videos and close ups edited together. Five minutes of a movie could be a compilation of a month of these different takes and shots, and is likely to have no correspondence to the actor’s experience of acting.
Despite these arguments through which I have made Benjamin’s attitude towards technological reproduction seem very negative, it is important to note that Benjamin’s application of the ideals of capitalism to a product (his being art), is not entirely pessimistic. The critic’s idea of value is fluid, and he sees the usefulness in being able to reproduce art for the entire world to see, rather than just in its exclusivity for a certain “cult”. Film’s ability to be slowed and played over again allows us to notice details we would normally miss in a play only seen once or irreproducible human interaction. Film allows us to see “what happens during the split second when a person actually takes a step”(Benjamin 1066). The wonderful qualities of reproduction are not lost on Benjamin, and show us that the value found in scarcity is not necessarily diminished in reproduction, but transformed.


