The Problem with Truthiness: Nietzsche’s Conceptions of Truth or What Feels Untrue
Although separated by centuries, what Nietzsche attempts to explicate in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” can be easily summarized through Stephen Colbert’s coined term “truthiness“. Truthiness is defined by the dictionary as “the quality of seeming or being felt to be true, even if not necessarily true.” Truthiness is part of the very peculiar human desire that Nietzsche describes to desperately believe in something as if it were true; despite the fact that the very notion of knowing objective truth is impossible. Human beings are limited by language and therefore, a barrage of social constructions that prevent us from connecting our individual lived experiences to ‘the thing in itself’ (766-767).
Nietzsche is most concerned about human ‘truthiness’ in his discourse surrounding language and its inherent falsehoods. Language is designed to represent things and create perpetual metaphors for everything that involves the five human senses But, in Nietzsche’s view, language will always feel just a little bit arbitrary. Herein lies an example that is hopefully relatable and a tad more tangible. There is an odd feeling one gets when a word is repeated over and over again. After a while, a word can start to sound like a strange, foreign combination of letters and syllables that is devoid of meaning. Meaning, meaning, m-e-a-n-i-n-g, meaNING? You’re probably doing it right now. That’s because words themselves are devoid of meaning, human beings are the ones that award language its ability to translate concepts. However, in the Nietzschean view, it can never truly do so because an individual human experience with something is different every single time, for every single person (767-768). Someone from the Midwest and someone from Hawaii can have very different ideas of what the word ‘water’ means to them. Compartmentalizing experiences into one catch all term is part of that human truthiness, the desire to neatly sort out what we perceive as ‘truths’ is ultimately comforting and easier.
What I found most interesting in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” is that Nietzsche briefly points out how “dividing things up by gender” with both people and objects is an extension of language’s arbitrariness (766). Although Nietzsche is hardly a gender studies scholar, he recognizes that the manipulation of language to create binary categories in which to organize people is not inherent or biological by any means. It is a social invention. This is one of many interesting precursors to Judith Butler’s famous revelations in “Gender Trouble” where she more thoroughly addresses gender as a social construction that has little to do with nature, and a lot more to do with patriarchal nurture.
Above all, the human desire for things to be categorized, for things to be clear, and for things to not be “harmful” wins out, and truthiness overtakes all. Yet, the curious human pull towards some semblance of truth is still felt to this day. Nietzsche claims it can perhaps be witnessed through the consumption of art, which is able to question and tug at the strings of reality. And yet, out of art, like comedy perhaps, a concept like ‘truthiness’ can emerge. Then again, I’m not really sure who’s telling the truth.


